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CREATION AS THEODICY:
IN DEFENSE OF A KABBALISTIC
APPROACH TO EVIL
Robert Oakes

The doctrine of Tzimzum (or divine "withdrawal") occupies pride of place in
the Jewish mystical tradition as a response to what is arguably the chief theological or metaphysical concern of that tradition: namely, how God's Infinity
or Absolute Unlimitedness does not preclude the existence of a distinct
domain of finite being. Alternatively, how can it be that God, by virtue of His
Maximal Plenteousness, does not exhaust the whole of Reality? I attempt to
show that, while a plausible argument - one that does not involve the idea of
Tzimzum - can be mounted against this "pantheism" problem, the doctrine
of Tzimzum has considerable force as the nucleus of a theodicy.

In this essay I shall present in some expository depth, and reflect philosophically upon, an audacious and beguiling theory concerning what
God Must do in order to Create which has long enjoyed considerable
esteem and influence in the Jewish esoteric or mystical tradition
("Kabbalah"). Indeed, it is a theory that has occupied nothing less than
center-stage within the intricate "theosophical" scheme of the great sixteenth-century Kabbalist Rabbi Issac Luria. The thesis I hope to secure is
that the doctrine in question displays some very impressive-if as yet
philosophically unheralded-strength as the nucleus of a theodicy.
It would be well to clarify, however, that it is not my intention to
engage in theodicy here in the strong or classical sense. While it seems to
me that the explanation of evil' afforded by the Lurianic doctrine in
question has the serious prospect of hitting the nail on the head, i.e., of
being the actual reason for the existence of evil, no attempt will be made
in the sequel to vindicate quite that bold a claim. It should not be
inferred from this, however, that my purpose is simply to secure one
more "defense" for evil (in Plantinga's sense); i.e., one more "explanation" designed to refute the time-honored but by now fairly disreputable
notion that the existence of God is conceptually incompatible with the
existence of evil-or at least with all of the evil that actually exists.
Hence, the thesis that I shall defend is a bit more fleshy than the claim
that the explanation of evil to be elaborated is one for which there is conceptual space within the metaphysics of theism. Rather, I shall contend
that the relevant Lurianic theory can properly be held to constitute the
core of a plausible (or respectable) explanation of evil. As will be discussed
later on in some detail, my central justification for maintaining this is
that the theodicy rooted in Rabbi Luria's doctrine- notwithstanding an
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ostensibly problematic aspect of it (to be spelled out at the tail end of
these deliberations)- possesses explanatory virtues that are not readily
found in more standard (or less "mystical") theodicies. First, however,
some important background concerning the impetus for, and nature of,
the Lurianic "theosophical" doctrine in question.
II

To begin with, Rabbi Luria's account does not seem to have been
designed primarily with theodicy in mind. Rather, it was fundamentally
intended as a response to what is arguably the chief metaphysical or theological concern of the Jewish mystical tradition 2-a concern which can
suitably be expressed by the following question(s): how is it that God, as
the Being or Substance Who is necessarily limitless in all respects, manages to create a domain of contingent being (the natural universe or cosmos) which is-in some entirely proper sense-metaphysically distinct
from Him? Alternatively, since God's absolute unlimitedness cannot but
ensure that He is infinitely plenteous, how can there possibly exist finite
or created objects which do not ultimately reduce to mere aspects of
Him? How can there be metaphysical room' a domain of existents distinct
from God's limitless Being? Alternatively, could it seriously be denied
that the Divine Substance must be ontologically exhaustive? Rather,
does not consistency demand, as would come to be held by Spinoza and
Spinozists, that God must be all-inclusive, and, accordingly, that every
constituent or element of the domain of "Nature" must ultimately
reduce to a mere aspect or (following Spinoza) mode of God; i.e, reduce
to one of the ways that God is? In sum, while it is central to classical theism (hence to classical Judaism) that the conception of God as absolutely
limitless does not metaphysically eventuate in Spinozistic pantheism,
how can classical theists justifiably deny that God does not exhaust the
whole of Reality?4
Intriguingly, it has been central to canonical theism that God, while
clearly transcending the natural order that He creates and sustains, is
nonetheless immanent in His Creation. Indeed, the tradition has standardly maintained that God is pervasively immanent (omnipresent) in
the spatiotemporal order. This notwithstanding, however, traditional
theism has resolutely insisted that pervasive immanence does not entail
(what might aptly be called) exhaustive immanence; i.e. God's being such
that "there is no place empty of Him'" is not to be taken to imply that
God incorporates all of the being that there is. To sharpen further the
notion of exhaustive immanence, consider the difference between the
aesthetic creations of a painter and those of a dancer." To begin with,
while the painter can go off and leave her work behind, the dancer clearly cannot. Rather, the aesthetic product which constitutes the dance-performance could not conceivably exhibit temporal extension without
being conserved through the applicable time-span by the relevant
dancer. In just this respect, then, the relation between God and the cosmos shares an important feature with the relation that obtains between
the dancer and the dance. For it is central to normative theism that the
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cosmos could not conceivably exhibit temporal extension minus the
exercise of God's conserving power.
This parallel between God-and-cosmos and dancer-and-dance, however, is quickly overshadowed by a central dissimilarity. For God's pervasive immanence in the cosmos (on, of course, the canonical account) is
not nearly as radical as the immanence of the dancer in the dance. That
is, unlike the case of the painter and the painting, the dance enjoys no
real or metaphysical distinctness from the dancer; rather, the dance just
is-is fully constituted by-the (aesthetically stylized) motion of the
dancer.
Alternatively, the dancer-in-appropriate-motion exhausts the danceperformance; the dance simply reduces to-is nothing more than-the
dancer-in-appropriate-motion. Accordingly, the issue which the
Lurianic theory concerning Divine Creation was designed to resolve can
with propriety be rendered as follows: while traditional theists unequivocally reject the notion that the exhaustive immanence of the dancer in
the dance constitutes an accurate model of God's immanence in the
world, how-in light of its conception of God as absolutely limitlessare they rationally entitled to that rejection? How could spinoza and
friends possibly be wrong in holding that, by virtue of God's Infinity,
the Divine Substance and its modes "form the sum total of existence?"7
III
Rabbi Luria's bold and mythically powerful attempt to overcome this
putative difficulty relies heavily upon the concept of Tzimizum, which
can properly be translated as "withdrawl" or "retreat." The basic idea is
this: in order to make "metaphysical room" for the existence of the
world, God brings about (as it were) a "self-contraction:" a constriction
of the infinite plenteousness of His Being to the extent that would allow
for His creation (or, as R. Luria would seem to prefer, Emanation) of a
natural universe, which, while radically dependent upon God for its
continuity, enjoys (as opposed to the case of the dance and the dancer)
some measure of "separateness" from God. Engaging for the moment in
a bit of naive or anthropocentric picture-thinking, imagine God "inhaling deeply" or "sucking in His chest" and just holding it there in order
to allow for His Creation of a distinct domain of contingent being.
How should we assess this theory? To begin with, it is apparent that
the doctrine of Tzimizum cannot be taken in a straightforwardly metaphysical or literal sense. Moreover, it seems evident that it was never
intended to be taken in that way. As stated by Rabbi Schneur Zalman,
one of the giants of Jewish mysticism (whom we will have occasion to
revisit): " .. .it is totally impossible to take the doctrine of the constriction
literally ... "~ It is, of course, easy to see why. As the sages of the tradition
well understood (without, of course, expressing the point in the vocabulary of contemporary modal logic), no individual could have the
"power" to divest itself of any property which it possesses essentially.
Alternatively, properties possessed essentially are possessed immutably.
Hence, since omnipotence clearly does not include the possession of
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conceptually impossible powers, God does not possess the "power" to
divest Himself of (or in any way modify) His limitlessness or infinite
plenteousness. Thus, the Lurianic doctrine of Tzimizum-when literally
interpreted-cannot possibly constitute a true account of how an
absolutely unlimited Being could fail to be ontologically exhaustive.
IV

Before moving center-stage into an elaboration of the deeper interpretation of Tzimzum and its intriguing relevance to theodicy, I want to take
just a brief interlude to suggest that there is a straightforwardly philosophical (or Tzimizum-independent) resolution to this time-honored
and-or so it seems to me-overstated "pantheism" problem. specifically, I think it can be shown that there is strong analogical justification for
holding that an unlimited Being need not be regarded as ontologically
exhaustive. Consider: it is axiomatic that God could not fail to possess
maximal or unlimited power; i.e., that God possesses all of the power
that could possibly be possessed by a single individual. (Spelling out the
entailments of this in some rigorous fashion remains, of course, a matter
of controversy.) However, this has never been seriously taken to
imply-even by those who embrace (some version of) occasionalism'othat God exhausts every last bit of power there can be. To the contrary,
however omnipotence is to be unpacked, it has long been recognized to
include the power to delegate suitable power to creatures. Precisely the
same principle obtains, of course, regarding maximal knowledge (omniscience). To be omniscient is to have all of the knowledge that a single
individual could possibly possess: it does not mean (or imply) that
God's knowledge must exhaust all of the knowledge there can be. If that
were the case, all finite persons-as beings putatively distinct from
God-would be saddled with total ignorance. Clearly, this would be a
patently absurd construal of Divine Omnsicience.
Now it seems to me that the foregoing observations provide us with
more than ample justification for rejecting the Spinozist conviction (or
"intuition") that God's maximal or unlimited plenteousness entails His
exhaustion of all being; i.e., that God is ultimately (in the "final analysis")
the only Existent. 12 For since, as just discussed, it is perfectly proper to
deny that God's maximal power and maximal knowledge entail that He
has a monopoly on power and knowledge, why is it not perfectly proper
to deny that God's maximal or unlimited plenteousness has the (pantheistic) implication that God has a monopoly on being? Rather, that God is
maximally plenteous can properly be taken to mean that the Substance
Who is God possesses the highest degree of plenteousness or being13 that
could possibly be possessed by a single individual; nothing else could
possibly approximate (let alone match) the plenteousness enjoyed by
God. But that, of course, hardly imples that God relates to the cosmos as
the dancer relates to the dance; i.e., that (in the"final analysis") nothing is
metaphysically distinct from the maximally plenteous Substance Who is
God. Accordingly, it seems entirely in order to conclude that classical or
Spinozistic pantheism is not an entailment of God's unlimited or infinite
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plenteousness. Of course, since analogical reasoning is structurally nonprobative or or nondefinitive, the foregoing argument fails to guarantee
the truth of its conclusion. This notwithstanding, however, it can still
constitute (as I believe it does) strong warrant for holding that contingent
or created objects are metaphysically distinct from the maximally plenteous Being Who created and sustains them. Moreover, there is much to
suggest that the nonprobative character of our argument is not simply a
function of its analogical structure; i.e., it may also have much to do with
the inherently philosophical (or metaphysical) nature of its conclusion.
For it may well be that there are no arguments with philosophically interesting conclusions (as, to take the present case, Maximal plenteousness does
/lot entail ontological exhaustiveness)-be they even deductively rigorous
and sound-which are probative or definitive in the sense that anyone
who accepted the premisses of such an argument but rejected its conclusion would be irrational or intellectually perverse." If so, then, since our
argument both has a philosophically interesting conclusion and is analogical in structure, that it is nonprobative may well be "overdetermined."
However, none of this vitiates an assessment of the argument as constituting an eminently plausible case for its conclusion; i.e., as providing a
strong analogical foundation for holding that God's maximal plenteousness does not require His exhaustion of reality.

v
Rabbi Schneur Zalman, the founder of Chabad Chasidism,15 suggests
an intriguing analogy as a clue to interpreting the real meaning of the
doctrine of Tzimzum. The construal in question in no way implies-in
contradistinction to the literalist understanding of the doctrine-the
impossible: namely, that God's infinite plenitude can in some way be
lessened or diminished. Rabbi Zalman asks us to consider the case of a
teacher who needs to present some rather complex or difficult idea to
her students. Since the class could not begin to grasp the relevant idea at
the teacher's plane of comprehension, she needs to "reduce" the concept
to a level at which it can be properly grasped by her students without
sacrificing any of its core content. (The sort of daunting challenge with
which teachers are regularly faced.) Alternatively, the students would
clearly be intellectively overwhelmed if the idea were to be presented at
something like conceptual full-throttle. Hence, the teacher needs to
"descend" (as it were) to the comprehension-level of the students. While
she reveals for the benefit of her students, she also needs to conceal for
their benefit: alternatively, in order to convey the concept effectively,
some intellectual braking-some tzimzum-is required.
According to Rabbi zalman, this analogy provides us with the requisite conceptual foothold for grasping the real or deep significance of the
Divine Tzimzum undertaken by God. vis-a-vis His Creation: namely,
God's concealing or severely restraining the full intensity of His infinite
or unlimited Radiance. Such Divine restraint is required to ensure that
the finite or limited beings produced by God are able to subsist or survive as such. That is, if God were to reveal the full intensity of His limit-
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less Radiance, finite being- hence human persons-could not but be
nullified or consumed by that Radiance. 1 " Alternatively, no finite existent
could possibly survive intact-could possibly withstand or endure- a
full-intensity revelation of God's Spiritual Power. Intriguingly, and as
readily confirmed, there is serious Scriptural support for this idea. In
Exodus 33:18, Moses makes the following request of God: "Show me
now Your glory." Here is how God (in part) responds: "You will not be
able to see My face, for man shall not see Me and live" (Exodus: 33:20).
Then, just a bit further on (Exodus: 22-23), God states:
" ... While my glory pas seth by ... 1 will put thee in a cleft of the rock,
and will cover thee with My hand until I have passed by. And I
will take away My hand, and thou shalt see my back; but My face
may not be seen."
Hence, there is just so much of the Divine Holiness that human persons
have the capacity to sustain. Anything stronger than this would ensure
their annihilation or nullification as individuals metaphysically distinct
from God.
This theme surfaces often in many central Jewish sources and among
many seminal Jewish thinkers. As observed by the great medieval
philosopher and Biblical exegete Levi Ben Gerson (Gersonides) in his
commentary on Deut. 4:33 ("Has a people ever heard the voice of God
speaking from the midst of the fire as you have heard, and survived?"):
A human being could not live after experiencing a degree of revelation that was far above his spiritual capacity [much as a person
can be blinded by a sudden flash of light]. Even Jacob thought himself fortunate to survive an encounter with an angel-yet the entire
nation of Israel heard the voice of God and remained aliveY
Nonetheless, as noted by the distinguished (late) Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan:
... the first reaction at Sinai was one of shock. The people could not
endure the majesty of God's word, and our sages teach us that
their souls literally left them. Their reaction is expressed in the
Biblical account of sinai where immediately afterward they told
Moses (Ex.20:l6), "You speak to us and we will listen, but let not
God speak with us any more, for we will dieY
Moses' remarkable level of holiness ensured that he was uniquely suited
to receive God's word. This notwithstanding, and as noted just above,
even he-as a finite being-could not have absorbed God's full or complete Glory: (" ... My face may not be seen").
Accordingly, the Jewish mystical tradition has insisted that some
"veiling" of the Divine Countenance-some "hiding of the face" (as it
were), i.e., Hester Panim-is required so that the Divine Light" ... shall not
manifest itself in a greater radiance than the lower worlds are capable of receiving." IY Here, then, we have the proper or authoritative interpretation of
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the doctrine of Tzimzum. Just as sunscreen on exposed skin is needed to
protect us from what would be the harmful effects-at a certain level of
intensity-of the rays of the sun, one can properly (albeit metaphorically) view the Divine Tzimzum as God's "protective sunscreen." As
admirably encapsulated by the contemporary expositor and representative of the the mystical tradition Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, "The basic idea is
that the infinite light cannot reveal itself as it is in [or to) the finite, for
the finite could not possibly contain it."20

VI
The question of moment, then, is surely the following: what does all
of this have to do with theodicy? Alternatively, what connection is there
between the doctrine of Tzimzum (properly interpreted) and the existence of evil or unmerited suffering? Well, the the notion that I shall go
on to defend is this: the Divine Tzimzum requisite for Divine Creation
comes at a serious metaphysical price; namely, an unavoidable by-product of the "veiling" of the Divine Countenance (Radiance, Holiness) to
the extent required for finite being to survive intact-for it not to be
absorbed or consumed by the Infinite-is a serious potential for unmerited suffering. For the revelatory depth of Divine Radiance or Holiness
necessary to cure the world of such evil could not but result in the eradication of the finite as a distinct domain of being. Here is an analogy: the
intensity of gamma radiation that it would take to cure patient X of his
pathology would clearly result in his death.
At the heart of this theodicy, then, is the principle that the depth to
which goodness and justice manage to prevail within the domain of the
created or the finite is a function of-if not just extensionally one withthe depth to which the power of God's Holiness or Radiance is manifested within Creation. Hence, since there must be some concealment of this
Radiance-some Hester Panim or Tzimzum-to ensure the existence and
perdurance of the finite, goodness and justice do not always prevail,Zl
Alternatively, because nothing short of Divine Tzimzum could begin to
guarantee the survival intact of the domain of created being, God's
providential governance of the cosmos cannot fully ensure against
unmerited suffering; i.e. against the sort of suffering starkly dramatized
by the Book of Job. Accordingly,
... the root of evil ultimately lies in the very nature of Creation
itself...because of its nature as Creation-i.e., as other than
Godhead- an element of imbalance, defectiveness and darkness
must enter into every restricted existence ... the rigorous theistic
[nonpwitheistic] tendency of Lurianic Kabbalah ... requires evil as a
factor necessarily inherent in Creation per se, without which
Creation would instantly lose its separate existence and return to
being absorbed in the Infinite. 22
Hence, our theodicy can be encapsulated as follows: since finite persons (along with finite being in generaD- solely by virtue of their fini-
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tude-are constitutionally unable to withstand anything close to a fullscale revelation of God's Infinite Radiance, Divine Creation requires
Divine Tzimzum (or Hester Panim), i.e., some serious concealment of that
Radiance. This, in turn, provides "metaphysical room" (as it were) for
unmerited suffering. Accordingly, it seems clear that God has the requisite
morally sufficient reason for permitting such suffering so long as He has a
morally sufficient reason for undertaking Tzimzum. It is, however, indisputable-given the (intuitively secure) assumption that finite persons
who can come to know God, love God, and center their lives in God constitutes an enormous or surpassing good-that God does have a morally
sufficient reason for undertaking Tzimzum: namely, the domain of created
or finite being could not otherwise perdure. Hence, it seems to follow
undeniably that God would have a morally sufficient reason for permitting the unmerited suffering that at times befalls human persons by virtue
of the Tzimzum which is required for them to exist and perdure as such.
VII

Does this theodicy have much to recommend it? I want to argue that
the answer to this question is Yes. First off, it has no shortage of explanatory virtue: it accounts quite naturally for unmerited suffering in the
sense that the occurrence of such suffering is not at all surprising if
Divine Tzimzum is indeed a necessary condition for the existence and
perdurance of the finite. Of arguably even greater significance, however,
is that the theodicy under discussion copes remarkably well with the
problem that goes to the very core of traditional theism's attempt to deal
with the world's evil; i.e., what might suitably be called the
"Manicheanism-vs.-Divine sovereignty" problem concerning the ultimate source of evil. Intriguingly, it is the first issue taken up by Kant in
his discussion of the problem of evil in his Lectures on Philosophical
Theology. Here is his admirably eloquent elaboration of it: 23
Where does the evil in the world come from if the sole original
source of everything is holy? This objection gains its strength primarily through the consideration that nothing can arise without its
first predisposition having been made by its creator. What, then? ..
Because they were unable to make sense of this, it occurred to men
long ago to assume a special evil original being, who had wrested a
part of all things from the holy original source and impressed its
own essence on that part. But this manicheanism conflicts with
human reason ... What, then? Shall we derive evil from a holy
God?
Clearly, traditional theism could not begin to countenance any account
of the ultimate source of evil (of whatever variety) that smacks of
Manicheanism: any account which involved or made reference to an ultimate (uncreated) malevolent force with sufficient power to test, challenge, or foil the sovereignty of God. Hence, the pressing and vexed
question: how did evil ever find its way into a cosmos with the finite per-
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fection of being the directly willed product of a metaphysically and axiologically flawless Being Who is also the absolute or unrivalled sovereign
of that cosmos?24 Unless God's absolute sovereignty is to be sacrificed,
there would seem to be something less than fully acceptable or tenable
about the prevalent view that, while God undoubtedly permits the occurrence of evil (for, presumably, a morally sufficient reason), there can be
no proper sense in which He constitutes its source (or cause).2' Moreover,
there is no shortage of passages in Scripture which call this view into
question; e.g. "Shall evil befall a city, and the LORD hath not done it?"
(Amos 3:6); "Out of the Most High proceedeth not Evil and good?"
(Lamentations 3:38); "I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace,
and create evil; I am the LORD, that doeth all these things." (Isaiah 45:7).
This is not in any way to suggest, let it be clear, that God must be taken to
ordain the existence of evil, i.e., that He produces evil in just the direct or
intentional manner in which He produces the natural universe. Indeed, ifas has been maintained by every theistic metaphysician with whose thought
I am familiar-the inherent nature of evil consists in privatio bani, then, insofar as nothing ordained or intentionally produced by God can constitute privations of being or value-" ... He only produces being, and all being is a
good"2h-evil cannot be directly willed by God. However, God does not
have to intend the existence of evil in order for Manicheanism to be false.
Rather, God can still be the ultimate source of evil in a purely extensional
sense of "source," and it is hard not to see this as a serious virtue of the
theodicy which has been elaborated. Specifically, the theodicy in question
allows us to comfortably maintain that there is a perfectly proper sense in
which God is the ultimate source of evil, though His causation of it is clearly
(indirect or) unintentional. Rather, evil can properly be regarded as an unintended by-product of the Divine Hester Panim or Tzimzum which is requisite
to ensure that the domain of finite being which God has created and sustains
is not annihilated, consumed, or nullified by (what would otherwise be) the
intensity of a full-blown revelation of His limitless Spiritual Radiance.
Hence, the theodicy in question would seem to have the remarkable
virtue of accounting for the world's evil in a manner which is scrupulously non-Manichean without in any way embracing the intuitively unsavory
(if not conceptually untenable) view that a maximally or infinitely Holy
Being ordains or intends the existence of evil or undeserved suffering. I
know of no theodicy presently on the books that has dealt (or is able to
deal) in a more metaphysically satisfying way with the "Manicheanismvs. -Divine Sovereignty" problem concerning the ultimate provenance of
evil. Accordingly, when this virtue of the theodicy under discussion is
coupled with its considerable explanatory power vis-a-vis the existence of
unmerited suffering, it is hard to resist the conclusion that the doctrine of
Tzimizum-properly interpreted, of course-has much to recommend it as
the nucleus of an eminently respectable theodicy.
VIII

By way of postscript, I want to deal briefly with an ostensible conundrum for our theodicy which may appear to undermine or mitigate the
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case for its plausibility. Consider: central to Judaism (as well, of course,
as to Christianity) is the doctrine that there is eventually destined to
occur on the world's stage a messianic consummation of history. The
presumably outstanding feature of this long-anticipated time or era is
that there will be an unambiguous triumph of good over evil: that evil
will be defeated. 2 ' Accordingly, evil would then constitute-along with
dinosaurs and the Ice Age, etc.-a "thing of the past." The putative
dilemma, however, is this: how could evil ever be defeated, if, as would
seem to be implied by the theodicy which has been elaborated and
defended, it "comes with the territory;" i.e., if, to cite once again the
words of Gershom Scholem, "the root of evil ... lies in the very nature of
Creation itself... "? Alternatively, how could evil ever be defeated if, by
virtue of the Divine 'Tzimzum or Hester Panim that is necessary to prevent the annihilation or nullification of the finite by God's Infinite
Radiance, it constitutes an inherent or structural defect of the finite?
First off, it would be well to note that the doctrine of the Messiah
would seem to be one of those tenets of Judeo-Christian belief which are
not readily amenable to rational vindication. Nonetheless, I think that we
can get enough of a conceptual grip on the question to provide the bare
bones of a promising argument for concluding that the view that evil will
eventually be defeated can properly be regarded as consistent with the
theodicy under discussion. Consider: A long-standing tenet of the Jewish
(and also, I believe, of the Christian) faith is that, through the performance of Godly or holy actions (kindness, charity, mercy, etc.)-actions
which instantiate the concept of Imitatio Dei-more of God's Radiance or
Holiness is brought into the world: perhaps more perspicuously, God's
Radiance or Holiness is made more manifest in the world. Hence, the
degree to which God's Light becomes manifest in the world turns out to
depend in no small way upon the actions of human persons. (This should
not be taken to imply, incidentally, that Godly behavior by humans can
long be sustained or deepened independently of some Divine assistance
or Grace.) Note, however, that any increase in the degree to which God's
Radiance is manifested or revealed within Creation necessarily involves
(indeed, is tantamount to) a lessening of Hester Panim or Tzimzum; i.e., a
diminishment in God's concealment of His Infinite Radiance.
Accordingly, each bit of Godly behavior that we perform, by virtue of
allowing more and more of God's Light or Radiance into the world-and
thus reducing the level of Divine Tzimizum-serves to raise (in what may
well be a painfully slow or incremental manner) our tolerance threshold
for God's Radiance. (Consider this analogy: Susan needs to take a certain
powerful medication in rather large doses if she is to have a complete
recovery from her illness. At first, she was able to tolerate only very small
doses. However, by increasing her dosage just a little at a time, she is
now able to tolerate the very high doses that she needs.) However, any
lessening of Tzimzum-any increase in the extent to which God's Light or
Radiance is manifested or revealed in Creation-can only serve to bind
us more closely to the Source of that Holiness. Which, in turn, can plausibly be expected to reinforce and thus promote Godly behavior; but that,
of course, means a further lessening of Tzimzum-which, in turn, pro-
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motes yet more Godly behavior, and so on... Accordingly, this cycle of
mutual reinforcement between Godly behavior and the diminishing of
Tzimzum strongly suggests that there is nothing conceptually disordered
about the notion that mankind will finally achieve a sufficient level of
spiritual maturity or stength (though the twentieth-century, of course,
has hardly been encouraging in this regard) not to be obliterated by a
revelation of the degree of Divine Radiance that it takes to defeat evil.
Hence, our theodicy should not be taken to entail that evil constitutes an
absolutely ineradicable structural defect of our world; i.e., to entail that evil
is logically undefeatable. Accordingly, the long-standing Judeo-Christian
tenet that evil will ultimately be defeated in a messianic consumption of
history fails to constitute a conceptual obstacle to the plausibility of our
theodicy.28

Saint Louis University
NOTES
1. "Evil" will be construed throughout as a shorthand reference to suffering that is presumably (if not patently) unmerited or ill-distributed. It
seems clear that the venerable locus classicus for the problem raised by such
suffering is found in Scripture-i.e., the Book of Job. I shall not, in what follows, have much to say about what is standardly called moral evil. However,
I am confident that the central elements of the theodicy to be elaborated and
defended in the sequel can (without much strain) be adapted to suffering
brought about by human voluntariety.
2. Cf. the discussion by Rabbi Jacob Schochet entitled "Mystical
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